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NOTE AND COMME NT
INTRNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND THx NATIONAL CouRTs.-The extending
of international recognition to a new government or a new state is a politi-
cal function which belongs exclusively to the political departments of govern-
ment. It follows that whenever the question of recognitior% or not is really
involved in litigation the court should inform itself, as to the course pursued
by the appropriate political department and decide accordingly. This much,
if it ever needed to be settled, may now be regarded as settled beyond per-
adventure. See I8 MIcH. L. ,RXv. 531.
The difficulties are those which arise in the application of a doctrine so
broadly stated. Not every litigation involving an unrecognized government
or state requires the decision of a question of recognition. If a decision on
recognition is not required, then it is entirely proper for the court to take
cognizance of a mere de facto government or state. The judiciary takes cog-
nizance of de facto situations at home or abroad, whether related to the con-
duct of foreign affairs or not, whenever it is possible to do so without be-
coming improperly involved in the decision of political questions. See Rose
v. Himely, 4 Cr. 241; Keene v. M'Donough, 8 Pet. 3o8; United States v. Rice,
4 Wh. 246; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. i; The Home Insurance Company's
Case, 8 Ct. Cl. 449, 22 Wall. 99; Van Deventer v. Hancke and Mossop, Trans-
vaal L. R. [9o3] T. S. 4o; Lemkuhl v. Kock, ibid. 451; Yrisarri v. Clement,
2 Carr. & Payne 223.
It is frequently a matter of peculiar difficulty to know how far the court
should go in taking cognizance of an unrecognized de facto government or
state. In the earlier cases the courts manifested an inclination to be con-
servative. Most of the situations presented were lumped into one category
for which a single broad generalization was thought sufficient. See x8 MIcH.
L. Rxv. 531. Later cases, particularly the recent case relating to Mexico and
Russia, have made it increasingly evident that the problem is much too com-
plicated for one category and a single generalization.
If it is clear t6a the rule invoked in a given case applies only to recog-
nized governments or states, then the court has only to ascertain whether
recognition has been granted or withheld and apply the rule accordingly.
This has been the situation in a number of important cases arising out of
loans to insurgents. Suppose, for illustration, that an insurrection is fo-
inented in a neighboring state, that one of our citizens advances funds by
way of loan to the revolutionists, and that he later finds that the persons to
whom he advanced the funds are perpetrating a fraud and appropriating the
rroceeds. The courts will afford the lender no relief unless the insurgents
have been recognized, either as belligerents or as an independent state, be-
cause loans to unrecognized revolutionists to promote insurrection in a friend-
ly state are illegal. Recognition is vital in this type of case because the
legality or illegality of the transaction depends upon it. See Jones v. Garcia
Del Rio, Turn. & Russ. 297; De Wiitz v. Hendricks, 9 Moo. 586, 2 Bing. 314;
Yrisarri v. Clem.,nt, 2 Carr. & Payne 223; Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. 194;
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Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sir. 213; Habershou v. Vardon, 4 De G. & Sm. 467;
Kennett v. Chambrters, 14 How. 38; CoRBEr, CASES (Ed. 3) II, 366.
The problem becomes much more difficult when the government of a
foreign state comes into court seeking relief with respect to state property
or other public interest. In case of a contest between rival governments it is
the recognized government which has standing in court. The Emperor of
Austria v. Day and Kossuth, 3 De G. F. & J. 217; The Hornet, 12 Fed! Cas.
529. Suppose, however, that the recognized government has been in fact
completely overthrown and succeeded by a new de facto government which
has not been recognized. There are at least two possible situations. Either
the political departments may continue to regard representatives of the old
government, now defunct, as the accredited representatives of the foreign
state, or the foreign state may be for the time without any recognized repre-
sentatives whatever. The former situation has recently arisen as regards
Russia; and it has been held in several cases that only the recognized agents
of Russia have any standing in court to ask relief on behalf of the state
which they claim to represent. The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294; The Penza, 277
Fed. 91. Compare United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. 94. The unrecognized
de facto government is no better off in the latter situation. The City of
Berne v. The Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347.
It has been suggested that courts .ought to make a distinction between
the case in which an unrecognized de facto government claims the public
property of its predecessor and the case in which such a government seeks
relief with respect to some property or other interest of its own. Borchard,
"Can an Unrecognized Government Sue," 31 YALE L Joua. 534. The latter
situation was presented in Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v.
Cibrario, recently-before the courts of New York. One of the departments
of the Soviet Government entered into a contract with the defendant in
Russi for the purchase of moving picture machines and supplies and deliv-
ered one million dollars to the United States commercial attach6 at Petro-
grad to be deposited in an American bank subject to draft according to the
contract's terms. The money was deposited in the National City Bank of
New York. Thereafter the Soviet Government commenced an action in New
York to compel the defendant to account for sums of money which it was
alleged he had been obtaining from the fund through fraud. The Appellate
Division made no distinction, but held that the action could not be main-
tained. 191 N. Y. Supp. 543. See also Preobazhlenski v. Cibrario, 192 N. Y.
Supp. 275. This decision has been affirmed very recently by the New York
Court of Appeals. The position is taken that the foreign government's
privilege of suing in our courts rests upon international comity, that in the
absence o recognition there can be no international comity, and consequent-
ly that an unrecognized government must be without standing in court. 69
Nzw Yoax LAw JouRNA. x.
In another type of situation, closely related to the one just considered,
the problem is presented to the court in connection with a claim to exemp-
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tion from jurisdiction. The immunities of diplomatic representatives have
been conceded to the agents of recognized states only when the diplomatic
character has been acknowledged by the executive department. In re Baiz,
135 U. S. 403; United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. 94; Savici V. City of New
York, 193 N. Y. Supp. 577. Very likely immunities would be denied the
agents of an unrecognized government or state, although the case is distin-
guishable and involves peculiar difficulties. The immunities of public ships,
in the recent English cases at least, have been made to depend upon recog-
nition. The Gagara [igg], P. 95; The Annette [igp], P. io5; x8 MIcH. L.
R~v. 531. The question of the immunities to be accorded other kinds of
public property belonging to a state without recognized government appears
to have beer rather acutely involved in the recent attempt of the Oliver
Trading Company to attach Mexican public funds in New York City. Ac-
cording to press reports, when the Secretary of State intervened he inform-
ed the New York courts that the public property of a foreign state is im-
mune from attachment. Does this mean that immunities may be enjoyed
by a foreign state where recognition of its government has been withheld?
Does the situation of a recognized state without recognized government differ
in this respect from the situation of an unrecognized state?
If we are to assume that states without recognized government enjoy
no immunity for their representatives, ships, or other public property, then
it would seem to follow logically that suits may be instituted against the
governments themselves. In Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
of Russia, the lower New York courts arrived all this astounding conclusion.
The Supreme Court observed that since there was no comity between the
United States and Russia the Soviet Government could claim no immunity
from suit. 192 N. Y. Supp. _82. This view was approved by the Appellate
Division. 195 N. Y. Supp. 472. But the Appellate Division has very recently
been reversed by the Court of Appeals, where it has been held finally that an
unrecognized de facto government cannot be sued for an act of confiscation
within its own territorial jurisdiction. 138 N. E. 24. The plaintiff's case ap-
pears to have been weakened by an admission that the Soviet Republic was
the existing de facto government of Russia, but admission or no the decision
is believed to be thoroughly sound. The de facto character of the Soviet
Government was matter of common knowledge. It was being sued for an
exercise of authority within its own jurisdiction. If the court had insisted
upon making recognition the criterion of immunity, it would have blundered
unwittingly into the very sort of delicate political question which it is the
reason of the rule in regard to recognition to avoid.
We come finally to situations like that presented in Luther v. Sagor &
Co., [ig2i] i K B. 456, [i92i] 3 K. B. 532, 2o MIcH. L. RZv. 243, in which
the only contest is between individuals about matters of private right. Sure-
ly in such situations the courts ought to feel no diffidence about taking cog-
nizance of the existence of an unrecognized de facto government or state
and of the capacity of a de facto government to do such acts as are required
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in the appointment of administrators, the adjudication of titles, the collec-
tion of taxes, the issuing of currency, the creation of corporations, or even
the confiscation of property. Unfortunately, in some of the most important
cases of this type decided to date, the courts have been persuaded that the
situation required the application of the rule in regard to recognition. In
addition to Luther v. Sagor & Co., see Pelzer v. United Dredging Co., 193
N. Y. Supp. 675, 676, holding that so long as the United States withholds
recognition from the government functioning in Mexico an administratrix
appointed by a Mexican court can maintain no action in .courts of the United
States. Compare, however, Mr. Justice Ford's decision in Sokoloff v. Na-
tionai City Bank, as reported in The New York Times, Dec. 2o, 1922. Dis-
cussion of this phase of the problem is reserved for a later number of this
R sv'w in which it is intended to subject the whole question to more thor-
ough examination. E. D. D.
